

Facedrive: Million Dollar Payments to An Opaque BVI Entity, a DoA Legacy Business Model and Flailing Business Pivots; 95% Downside

- Facedrive recently went public with the core premise of being an “eco-friendly” ride hailing app allowing users to select electric vehicle or hybrid options. EV excitement has fueled the stock to a \$1.4 billion market cap and an absurd 908x revenue multiple.
- We think Facedrive is an EV-hype story stock whose story is about to unravel. We anticipate a sharp repricing of shares in the immediate future and see *de minimis* overall value in the company’s operations.
- The company recently paid \$8.2 million for one month of “marketing and consulting” services to an opaque British Virgin Islands (BVI) entity with a newly created name.
- Facedrive’s entire operating budget over the last twelve months (LTM) was \$6.3 million, so the monthly payment represented 130% of its entire LTM operating budget.
- The BVI entity appears to be associated with OilPrice.com, a known stock promotion site that admits in its disclaimers that stock usually plunge after they are done promoting them. We believe Facedrive will suffer a similar fate.
- Facedrive has relied extensively on a network of companies controlled by its CEO. The company’s 2019 filing statement detailed paying no fewer than 4 related-party entities controlled by its CEO. These entities were paid ~24% of its 2019 operating budget.
- Facedrive’s CEO, Sayan Navaratnam, already has one large public company failure in Creative Vistas, which currently trades on the OTC Pink sheets for ~\$0.03 per share.
- Facedrive has no sustainable edge—Uber/Lyft could simply add an EV option and eviscerate Facedrive’s niche if it ever becomes popular.
- Relative to Uber and Lyft, Facedrive is deeply disadvantaged. Its rivals have resources, first-mover advantages, and extensive user/driver networks. They sport war chests of about \$10.8 billion and \$600 million, respectively. By comparison, Facedrive’s change purse consists of just ~\$10 million; hardly enough to compete with incumbents.
- Rather than focusing on tackling just one resource-intensive highly competitive market like ridesharing, Facedrive recently entered a second—food delivery. We found Facedrive’s platform has a total of 17 restaurants compared to UberEats’ 400,000 and GrubHub’s 300,000.
- We called several of the “most popular” restaurants on the Facedrive Foods page. One didn’t seem to have a working phone number, and two said they don’t use Facedrive anymore.
- The company recently launched another pivot; a COVID-19 contact tracing app. Despite claims of completing development we found evidence suggesting that the company has significantly overstated its progress.

- The company also launched (1) a trivia app that mysteriously garnered dozens of 5-star reviews before it ever launched, and (2) a marketplace that appears to mainly sell hats and hoodies bearing its own brand, for \$70-\$100.
- We do not think Facedrive's core ride hailing business is viable and we find its "marketing" and related party spends to be extraordinary and alarming. We have doubts about the veracity of the company's claims relating to its ill-conceived side projects that appear hastily thrown together for PR value.
- With about a year of cash on its books, Facedrive will have some time to attempt other pivots, but we think this "story" stock is heading toward a hard repricing. We see 95% downside.

Background: A Struggling Ridesharing Company with Limited Resources and No Defensible Competitive Niche

Facedrive was founded in 2016 with the core premise of being an "eco-friendly" ridesharing app. It allows riders to choose environmentally friendly vehicles by giving them electric, hybrid or gas-powered options.

The company soft launched its app in Ontario in late 2017 and opened to other Canadian locales in the following years. [\[Pg. 21\]](#) Currently, the app operates in a handful of Canadian locations.

Facedrive's stock, on the other hand, gives the impression of a robust business; recently rocketing higher on electric vehicle hype, despite only having a tangential relationship to the industry. The stock has spiked about ~640% since it [came public via reverse merger](#) in mid-September 2019, helped along by a costly paid promotion effort, as we will delve into.

Current prices place the company's market cap at about ~\$1.41 billion, affording Facedrive an obscene revenue multiple of ~908x based on the run rate from last quarter's revenue, which was only \$388 thousand. The company has generated consistent net losses since inception.

The ridesharing industry operates as an intensely price competitive near-duopoly, where incumbents Uber and Lyft have incurred a cumulative multi-billion dollar annual cash burn in order to expand market share.

In comparison, Facedrive has very few users and minimal resources. Should it somehow overcome those obstacles, it has no sustainable differentiator. (Uber or Lyft could simply add electric vehicle options if they ever felt it worthwhile to eliminate Facedrive's supposed 'niche'.)

COVID materially disrupted the ridesharing industry earlier in the year; a shock that even Uber and Lyft have not fully recovered from. Facedrive, with its fledgling network, appears to have suffered mightily as it battled powerful incumbents during an industry slowdown.

Likely seeing the writing on the wall for its ridesharing prospects, the company has decided to pivot wildly with launches of products spanning an array of disparate industries. These include:

1. A COVID-19 contact tracing app
2. A trivia app
3. An Uber Eats / GrubHub clone
4. An eCommerce marketplace

All of these new endeavors appear to be misfiring, as we dig into. Beyond its struggles for direction, Facedrive displays several worrying signs, including numerous related party transactions with its CEO and a highly unusual series of payments to an opaque newly-named entity in the British Virgin Islands.

We think Facedrive is a story stock whose story is about to unravel. We anticipate a sharp repricing of shares in the immediate future and see *de minimis* overall value in the company's operations.

Part I: Troubling Signs—Paying \$8.2 Million to an Opaque BVI Entity for a Month of “Marketing” and Numerous Related Party Transactions

Facedrive's Unusual Deal With “Medtronics Online Solutions Ltd”, A Newly Renamed BVI Entity

In May 2020, Facedrive [announced](#) it had hired a company called Medtronics Online Solutions Ltd. to “perform marketing and strategic consulting services”. In the announcement, Facedrive's CEO strongly suggested that the services were part of a global marketing campaign to expand visibility of the company's ridesharing platform, its core business:

“As Facedrive prepares for global expansion, it is more important than ever to get our ‘people-and-planet first’ message across to audiences not only in Canada, but in the United States and Europe, in the most efficient and effective way. With that in mind, I am excited to work with Medtronics, whose unique marketing strategy and proven global outreach **will help us ensure that our first-of-its-kind eco-friendly ride-sharing platform** reaches the widest audience possible with maximum impact,” said Facedrive CEO Sayan Navaratnam.”

The price for the “marketing and strategic consulting” services was steep. The company later [disclosed](#) that it had paid Medtronics 800,000 shares for its initial month of services, valued at \$8.2 million, *and* an obligation to pay 105,000 shares ***each month for the next 7 months***. The shares are subject to certain lock-up restrictions, per the arrangement.

Neither announcement stated which jurisdiction Medtronics was located in – and finding this out was no trivial task. Despite being described as having a global marketing presence, Google had only 3 results for the entity outside of the Facedrive announcement (and all 3 results were actually related to/links to the announcement).



We located the entity in the British Virgin Islands, registered to nominee directors. [BVI Corporate records](#) show that the entity had been named Leacap Ltd. up until about a month before the Facedrive contract, when it changed its name to Medtronics.

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POST-INCORPORATION TRANSACTIONS

Change of Company Name or Add/Change of Foreign Character Name

BVI Company No. : 1975800

Company Name : LEACAP LTD

Foreign Character Name :

Company Type 2 : Segregated Portfolio Company
 Restricted Purpose Company
 Non-Profit Organisation
 Private Trust Company

Type Of Company Name Change : Only English Name
 Only Foreign Name
 Both English and Foreign Name
 Retain English Name and Remove Foreign Name
 Change English Name and Remove Foreign Name

Proposed Name: : Medtronics Online Solutions

Suffix: : Ltd

Date of Change: : 13/02/2020

Medtronics Appears to Be Associated With OilPrice.Com, a Stock Promotion Site. But This Apparent Promotional Arrangement Has Unusual Features

LeaCap Ltd. is [associated](#) with OilPrice.com, a website known for stock promotion. The site has issued at least 7 articles touting the glowing promises of Facedrive and its stock since March. [\[1,2,3,4,5,6,7\]](#)

We found the deal with Medtronics to be unusual for a number of reasons:

1. Size. Facedrive paid \$8.2 million to Medtronics in an initial payment. Facedrive's entire operating budget over the last twelve months (LTM) was \$6.3 million, meaning the company paid 130% of its LTM operating budget for one month of services, with additional payments to follow. [\[Pg. 4, Pg.8, Pg. 4\]](#) Typically, promoters are paid in the 5 or low 6 figures. We have yet to see a promoter paid this much or in such disproportion to a company's financials.

2. Opacity. The newly-changed Medtronics BVI entity had zero online footprint, making it challenging to even identify. BVI requires users to pay in order to even search a company name.

3. Misleading Disclosure. As shown above, the Facedrive announcement suggested Medtronics is being paid to market its *platform*, not its stock. We view Facedrive's disclosure as misleading. Furthermore, OilPrice.com added a custom [disclaimer](#) to its Facedrive articles that strikes us as a fig leaf meant to mirror Facedrive's dubious disclosure:

“An affiliated company of Oilprice.com... has signed an agreement to be paid in shares to provide services to expand ridership and attract drivers in certain jurisdictions outside Canada and the United States.”

Facedrive [doesn't currently operate](#) anywhere outside of Canada and has barely made headway in its home market, as we will show.

Furthermore, the content is unmistakably promotional. On [Apr 21st](#), OilPrice.com published an article about “6 Visionaries Shaping the Future of Transportation”, which compared major public company CEOs such as Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, Google’s Sundar Pichai, Tesla’s Elon Musk, Virgin’s Richard Branson... and Facedrive’s Sayan Navaratnam.

#2 Sayan Navaratnam

While Branson, Bezos and Musk are busy with “fly-me-to-the-moon” sentiments, Sayan Navaratnam-- planning to join the other transportation gurus—is quietly making moves on a more Earthly scale.

Another article describes Facedrive as part of the sustainability movement and [declares](#) “Buffet [sic], Bezos And Blackrock Are Betting Big On This \$30 Trillion Mega-Trend”.

What does that have to do with recruiting drivers outside of the U.S. and Canada?

(It does not appear that Buffett or Blackrock have stakes in Facedrive. Also, the name is spelled “Buffett” with two t’s—a buffet is a self-serve style of casual dining.)

Buffet, Bezos And Blackrock Are Betting Big On This \$30 Trillion Mega-Trend

By [Ian Jenkins](#) - May 28, 2020, 6:00 PM CDT



By the time giant high-tech, cash-burning companies like Uber catch on to the [\\$30-trillion-plus mega trend](#) of sustainable investing, their competition may have caught up.

OilPrice.com also shows the following [disclaimer](#) on its articles, which suggests that stocks it profiles have a habit of spiking then plummeting once it stops touting them. The language appears to us to be all but saying “stocks featured on our site pump then dump”:

“This communication is for entertainment purposes only... Frequently companies profiled in our alerts experience a large increase in volume and share price during the course of investor awareness marketing, which often end as soon as the investor awareness marketing ceases.”

We expect Facedrive is already on the back half of this “awareness marketing” trajectory.

Related-Party Transactions—The Company Paid 24% of its 2019 Operating Budget to Related Parties Controlled by the CEO

We found other troubling signs in Facedrive’s brief history as a public company. Despite its modest size, Facedrive has relied extensively on a network of companies controlled by its CEO. The company’s [2019 filing statement](#) detailed paying no fewer than 4 entities controlled by its CEO, providing everything from marketing, call center services, product development to office space. [[Pg. 64](#)]

Non-Arm’s Length Party Transactions

Dynalync, a related company controlled by Sayanthan Navaratnam, the CEO, director and co-founder of Facedrive, provides consulting services and product development to Facedrive. Total expenses charged to Facedrive were \$390,700 for the three-month period ended March 31, 2019 and \$568,000 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

Facedrive also engages DependableIT through Dynalync, a related company controlled by Sayanthan Navaratnam, the CEO, director and co-founder of Facedrive, to provide call center services to Facedrive. See “*Part III – Information Concerning Facedrive – General Development of the Business*”. Total expenses charged to Facedrive for DependableIT’s services are included in the expenses charged by Dynalync.

Decosta is a related company controlled by Sayanthan Navaratnam, the CEO, director and co-founder of Facedrive, provides marketing services to Facedrive. Total expenses charged to Facedrive was \$60,000 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2018.

Connex is a related company controlled by Sayanthan Navaratnam, the CEO, director and co-founder of Facedrive, subleases offices space in Ontario to Facedrive. See “*Part III – Information Concerning Facedrive – Narrative Description of the Business – Platform Offerings – Facedrive Locations*”. In addition, Facedrive was indebted to Connex in the aggregate principal amount of \$750,000 evidenced by a demand non-interest bearing promissory note. The indebtedness owing to Connex represents payment made by Connex on Facedrive’s behalf for operating expenses and was repaid in Facedrive Class B Shares pursuant to a debt conversion agreement dated March 31, 2019.

In total, the company expensed \$1.26 million to related entity Dynalync for R&D and operational support in 2019, representing over 24% of the company’s annual operating budget. [[Pg. 9](#)]

In the first quarter of 2020, the company has thus far only expensed a minimal amount to related parties for office space. [[Pg. 19](#)] We intend to monitor these transactions to see if they re-emerge in subsequent quarters.

Facedrive’s CEO Already Has One Public Company Failure. It Is Currently Trading For \$0.03 On The OTC Pink Sheets.

This also isn't Facedrive CEO Sayan Navaratnam's first foray into the public markets.

He was also CEO and Chairman of Creative Vistas, a broadband systems integrator primarily focused on servicing Canadian customers of Rogers Communications. Navaratnam was named Chairman and CEO of the company in 2004. [Pg. 3]

Despite glowing initial promises, the company was ultimately unable to service its debt due to lackluster revenue and cash flow. Navaratnam ended up [purchasing the company's](#) main operating [subsidiary](#) for \$1 plus the assumption of the company's debt. [Pg. 20]

In February 2011, the company [ceased being quoted](#) on the OTC Bulletin Board and was relegated to the OTC Pink Sheets.

It appeared to cease filing around 2012 and trades today for \$0.03 on the U.S. Over the Counter markets – representing ~99% downside for anyone who owned the stock at almost any point during its primary operating history.

Navaratnam is [still listed](#) on the company's website as the Chairman of the Board, which describes him as "the visionary who plays a key role for the growth strategy of Creative Vistas".




Given that Navaratnam brings the same "visionary" talents to Facedrive, we decided to dig further into the company's prospects and operations.

Part II: Swimming Against a Tidal Wave—How Facedrive Compares to Rivals Uber & Lyft

In an industry with virtually no *technological* barriers to entry, ridesharing companies are locked in an arms race to establish the largest rider & driver networks as the key competitive moat. After ~3 years of operation, Facedrive is nowhere close to making a dent in terms of revenue.

Relative to its competition, it *doesn't even show up*.




Facedrive Has Minimal Android and iOS Installs Relative to Its Main Competitors

We get another glimpse of how Facedrive is faring relative to industry leaders by tracking downloads on Android's Google Play store and Apple's App store. On Google Play, the largest market, [Uber](#) has 500+ million installs and [Lyft](#) has 10+ million, while [Facedrive](#) has barely eclipsed 10,000.



On the Apple App Store, which doesn't display installs but does show number of ratings, we see Uber with 1.2 million ratings, Lyft with 8.2 million and Facedrive with just 10.




Cash Poor: Facedrive Has Less Than 0.1% of the Cash Balance of Its Main Competitor; With Cash of Just US\$10 Million Compared to Uber’s US\$10.8 Billion

Facedrive clearly has a lot of catching up to do, which in the capital-intensive ridesharing industry requires substantial cash resources. The path to winning new drivers and riders often requires cash incentives, lower rates and extensive hardware and support infrastructure.

Uber, for example, has an accumulated deficit of over \$19 billion owing to its “first mover advantage” and large historical expenditures that propelled it to dominate new markets around the globe. [Pg. 4] It will likely burn substantially more cash before reaching profitability (if it ever gets there). Last quarter alone, Uber burned about \$850 million in cash. [Pg. 9]


As of the latest quarter, Uber and Lyft had war chests of about \$10.8 billion and \$600 million, respectively. By comparison, Facedrive’s change purse consists of ~\$10 million, which includes the proceeds from its recent [financing rounds](#).




Over the past 4 quarters, Facedrive has burned \$5.2 million in operating cash flow while generating only \$951 thousand in revenue. These numbers clearly do not bode well.

FaceDrive Has a Virtually Non-Existent Social Media Presence

Despite its lack of userbase and lack of cash, Facedrive seems well-suited for social media, where it could gain support for its stated mission of sustainability. However, we see that it has only 3,634 follows on Facebook and 764 followers on Twitter. These numbers pale in comparison to the combined millions of followers shared between Uber and Lyft.



The story looks the same on Twitter.



Facedrive's User Reviews on Both Google and Apple Are Worse Than Both of Its Main Competitors

Beyond its lack of revenue, lack of a user base, lack of cash, and lack of social media presence, Facedrive has worse user reviews than rivals, making it tough to gain market share based on user satisfaction and word of mouth.

Facedrive users regularly complain of being unable to get rides and poor/delayed customer service.

App Ratings

	Uber	Lyft	FaceDrive
App Store	4.7	4.9	4.4
Google Play	3.9	3.8	3.2


Facedrive Claims 13,000 Drivers, But the App Shows Almost No Drivers in Its Key Markets

Creating a vibrant network of drivers and users is essential for the success of any ridesharing platform.

A March 2020 Facedrive [investor presentation](#) seemed to suggest great progress along that path, boasting of 13,000 drivers *registered* on its platform. However, after our own analysis and testing we suspect the number of active drivers is significantly lower, likely in the range of 500-600.

The company reported gross fees from rides of \$852,200 in Q1 2020, which implies about 6-7 rides per working day for 500-600 drivers, given the historical average fee of \$10/ride. [[Presentation Pg. 20](#)]

This estimate was corroborated by our field testing. In the key Downtown Toronto region, we found the app regularly had only 2-4 drivers available. The most drivers we found at one time in Downtown Toronto was 7, which appeared on 5:00pm on a Friday (end of week rush hour/happy hour).



Facedrive support confirmed that all available drivers appear on the app's map.

Anecdotally, an industry colleague attempted a short trip in Toronto but the app was unable to match them with a ride after a 10-minute wait. After the match failed, **Facedrive support called their phone to ask if they still wanted a ride** (like a traditional, non-app based taxi service). They described the experience as "very strange".

In our own call with Facedrive support, the rep acknowledged that they do not have enough drivers in Downtown Toronto and that they often attempt to call in drivers from other areas, which increases wait times and worsens the user experience. He said in Scarborough they were more active, with ~10-15 drivers on the road at any given time.

Our review of the app showed that in Ottawa, which the company [launched](#) amidst much fanfare in the beginning of July, generally had zero to two drivers at a time. London, Ontario also had around 10-15 drivers on the road during our testing.

Part III: Off-Road—Facedrive's Numerous Business Pivots Suggest a Company Flailing Without Clear Direction

Startups that struggle with their original idea will often undergo a "pivot" or a significant change in business direction, in an effort to reinvent themselves and find a sustainable niche. Sometimes, when

businesses try to opportunistically cash in on trendy PR lingo that has lifted other companies' stock prices, they will engage in *more than one* pivot (see our recent [reporting](#) on Ideanomics, for example).

Given its hurdles in ride hailing, we were not surprised to see Facedrive attempt to change course. However, rather than picking one project, the company has launched numerous disparate buzzword-laden projects in the past several months, including:

1. A COVID-19 contact tracing app that aims to employ "AI" (COVID stocks have surged over the last few months)
2. An Uber Eats/Grub Hub clone called Facedrive Foods (GRUB was recently the target of a takeover bidding war).
3. An eCommerce marketplace (eCommerce stocks are skyrocketing as lockdown has kept everyone at home)
4. A trivia app.

Facedrive is single-handedly attempting to succeed in ride share, ESG, COVID-19 tracing, AI, food delivery, and more. While the collective endeavors have lent themselves well to numerous buzzword-laden press releases, none of the efforts appear to be succeeding.

Facedrive's Pivot to COVID-19 Contact Tracing App Developer—Emails With Partners Raise Questions About the Company's Claims of Advanced Progress

With COVID-19 lockdowns having a materially negative impact on ride sharing services, Facedrive made a hard pivot.

On [April 20th 2020](#), the company announced that it had created an app to help with COVID-19 contact tracing. The language of the announcement strongly suggested the app was already developed/created and was approaching a near-term release:

"Facedrive...is pleased to announce that in collaboration with University of Waterloo, **has developed** (sic) "TraceScan", a digital contact-tracing app designed to support nationwide efforts to slow the spread of COVID-19."

"TraceScan **was created** in an effort to offer ongoing frontline assistance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic"

"The app is expected to release within the next 30 days."

Despite these representations, we reviewed emails with the University of Waterloo professor leading the project that directly contradict Facedrive's statements.

As of May 17th, almost a month after Facedrive's above April 20th announcement, the professor stated that a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was in place, but no agreement had been formalized and resources still needed to be allocated to the project.

Note that according to Facedrive's April 20th announcement, the "developed" app was set to be released around this time. Contrary to these representations, there apparently wasn't even a final agreement in place to *begin* development.

Despite the apparent lack of an agreement, Facedrive has continued to issue press releases suggesting significant progress.

On May 28th, the company [announced](#) that the University of Waterloo was working to enhance the TraceScan platform with AI, which it expected would be ready for testing in 30 to 90 days. Waterloo was also apparently developing Bluetooth-based wearables:

“Facedrive Health and Waterloo researchers are also developing Bluetooth-based wearables that will improve contact tracing accuracy and real-time monitoring of the recovery progress through measurement of specific vital signs.”

Despite this announcement, in late June, emails reviewed with the University of Waterloo showed that the contract appeared to still be unsigned, and that the new focus was on applications for the workplace.

The change of focus to the workplace is likely because Facedrive had been competing for a contract from the government of Canada to be the country’s official COVID-19 tracing app. In mid-June, the government [announced](#) that it selected its own [Federally-backed project](#) for the task, closing the door to a major potential opportunity for Facedrive.

The company continues to tout its app, however. This week, Facedrive [announced](#) that its wearables were available on the Microsoft App store “by invitation only”. This means that the app is not accessible to the general public, making it very difficult to assess its functionality.

We have reached out to the University of Waterloo professor for an update on the project this week but have not heard back as of this writing.

We have also reached out directly to Facedrive’s CEO to ask for clarification on (i) the status of the company’s contact tracing app; (ii) whether/where it is actively being used; (iii) whether the wearables are able to be purchased; (iv) who manufactures the wearables, and; (v) whether a formal contract (not an MoU) is or ever was in place with the University of Waterloo.

We have not heard back as of this writing, but **we hope the CEO provides the market more clarity on what exactly they have developed and when they developed it** – especially given the claims and relatively vague details provided in company press releases.

Facedrive Foods—An Uber Eats/GrubHub Clone with No Credible Shot at Success


Rather than focusing on tackling just one resource-intensive highly competitive market like ridesharing, Facedrive recently entered a second—food delivery.

Facedrive launched “[Facedrive Foods](#)” around [May of this year](#) in an attempt to compete with Uber Eats. (Facedrive Foods is alternately referred to as [Eats by Facedrive](#) on its website, without clear explanation for the mixed branding).

One of the benefits of having a large, vibrant, user network is the ability to launch new complimentary services. This is probably why Uber launched Uber Eats, which tapped into its large existing network of drivers and users to monetize personal transportation in a different way.

This is also probably why Facedrive, with its lack of an existing significant network, should **not** be launching a food delivery service.

Unsurprisingly, Facedrive Foods/Eats by Facedrive appears to be struggling. As of this writing, a total of 17 restaurants are [available](#) on its platform. Here is how Facedrive’s platform compares to the primary apps in this steeply competitive market:




The company has also made a rather big deal out of an acquisition of certain assets of bankrupt Foodora, a failed food delivery service in Canada.

Facedrive has issued [multiple](#) announcements about what it termed the “[major](#)” acquisition of Foodora assets, which seem to consist of marketing lists purchased from the company out of bankruptcy. Terms of the [deal](#) show that Facedrive paid \$500,000 for the customer and restaurant lists of the failed company and can now market to them “subject to customer consent and opt in”.

Facedrive Foods—We Called Several of the “Most Popular” Restaurants on the Platform. Two Said They Don’t Work with Facedrive Anymore and the 3rd Had a Non-Working Number


We called the first several “[most popular](#)” restaurants on the Facedrive Foods page.

Choose From Most Popular



Here is what we were found (we have the calls recorded):

1. Se7en Flavours: The phone number from Google and other websites [didn't work](#) for us.
2. Royal Paan: The person answering said they use DoorDash, Uber and Skip but not Facedrive.
3. Ruchi Takeout: The person answering checked with co-workers to see if they still work with Facedrive and then replied “No we don't do that anymore, Facedrive.”
4. “Fusion by T”: We couldn't actually locate a store front for Fusion by T as it appears to be a catering service. We noticed an Instagram account that seemed affiliated with Facedrive as it linked directly to the site.




Facedrive's Newly Launched Trivia App Somehow Managed to Rack Up Dozens of 5-Star Reviews Before it Even Launched

On June 17th the company announced the [launch](#) of a trivia app in order to “encourage building connections and practice social distancing” during COVID. It is a [separate app](#) from Facedrive requiring its own download.

As of this writing, the app had 2 reviews on the Apple App store, and about 150 reviews on Google Play.

About 1/3 of the apps ratings on [Google Play](#) were from June 11th—six days before the [announced](#) launch of the app. All were 5 stars. Exactly one month later, on July 11th, the app gained another burst of 17 reviews, all but one of which were 4 stars, including reviews from users such as “Justin Bieber” and “Tom Hanks”.


We tried the app and found the questions to be fairly unusual:



It is unclear what the monetization plan for the trivia app might be if it ever manages to establish a significant userbase.

Facedrive's New "MarketPlace"—An eCommerce Store That Once Again Seems to Spread the Company Thin, with Little to Show for It

In May 2020 Facedrive [launched](#) the "highly anticipated" Facedrive [MarketPlace](#), which seems to largely sell hoodies and hats branded with Facedrive and a brand called "Bel Air" for ~\$100. We can't imagine these are hot sellers.



With limited engineering resources, including a historical reliance on outsourced product development, it seems that Facedrive is spreading its thin resources broadly.

Conclusion: A Frothy Market Lifts Many Boats, But We Don't Expect This to Remain One of Them

We do not think Facedrive's core ride hailing business is viable and we find its "marketing" and related party spends to be extraordinary alarming. We have doubts about the veracity of the company's claims relating to its COVID contact tracing app. Its trivia app, its Uber Eats clone, and its marketplace strike us as ill-conceived side projects hastily thrown together for show.

With about a year of cash on its books, Facedrive will have some time to attempt other pivots, but we think this "story" stock is heading toward a hard repricing. We see 95% downside.

Disclosure: We are short shares of Facedrive

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